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Abstract
This Article first considers the extent to which a patentee is entitled, under the various Con-
ventions governing jurisdiction and enforcement, to which all EU Member States are signatories,
to choose the forum in which to sue for infringement. This Article then considers the factors
which a patentee is likely to look for when choosing the forum in which to bring proceedings for
infringement. It concludes by considering the extent to which, bearing these factors in mind, vari-
ous jurisdictions within the European Union offer advantages to potential plaintiffs in infringement
actions over other jurisdictions. A comprehensive comparison of all jurisdictions in the European
Union is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article will focus primarily upon the prac-
tice and procedure of the courts of the United Kingdom and Germany, referring briefly to certain
other Member States of the European Union, namely, France and Italy.
PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND FORUM




Despite the move towards harmonization of intellectual
property laws throughout the European Union, the national
courts of the European Union continue to apply differing proce-
dural rules and employ different approaches in patent infringe-
ment actions. This was illustrated in the Improver case.1 In Im-
prover, the European Patent Office ("EPO") 2 granted a patent
and, therefore, issued it in identical form as a bundle of national
European patents.3 Article 69 of the European Patent Conven-
tion ("EPC")4 and the Protocol to the European Patent Conven-
tion ("Protocol")5 provide a test of infringement to guide judges
* This Article was presented at the Forth Annual Conference on International
Property Law and Policy at Fordham University in April 1996.
** Partner, Clifford Chance, London.
*** Associate, Clifford Chance, London.
1. Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181 (Eng.
Ch. 1989).
2. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270, art.
75(1)(a). The European Patent Office ("EPO") is located in Munich. Id. It is the
EPO's task to examine every patent application for novelty and capability of industrial
use. Id. art. 52(1). If the EPO grants an inventor a European patent, the inventor is
deemed to possess a patent in each of the states that ratified the EPC, i.e., each con-
tracting state. Id. art. 64(1).
3. Id. art. 64(1).
4. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter EPC].
The European Patent Convention ("EPC") was enacted on March 1, 1979 and pro-
motes the harmonization of European patent laws. John P. Hatter, Jr., The Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Litigation: An Analysis of the Epilady Controversy, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 461, 494 n.56 (1995). The nine EU Member States as well as five non-EU Mem-
ber States signed the EPC. Id. Due to its ratification by most EU Member States as well
as several non-EU Member States, the EPC is currently effective throughout most of
Western Europe. Id.
5. Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 13
I.L.M. 348 [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol states:
Article 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the extent of the protec-
tion conferred by a European Patent is to be understood as that defined by the
strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, the description and
drawings being employed only for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity
found in the claims. Neither should it be interpreted in the sense that the
claims serve only as a guidline and that the actual protection conferred may
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in the interpretation of a patent claim. This test has been incor-
porated into the laws of all the European contracting states.' In
Improver, the Remington device7 alleged to infringe was the same
in all contracting states. Notwithstanding all these common fac-
tors, the English and German courts reached opposite conclu-
sions in parallel litigation in the two countries. 8
Thus, despite European patents and harmonized patent
laws in the European Community, in the absence of a Commu-
nity Patent Appeal Court, similar to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Court in Washington D.C., there is a considerable advan-
tage to the plaintiff patentee to engage in forum shopping' in
the European Union. Consequently, it is important for prospec-
tive plaintiffs to consider the possible advantages which may be
gained by choosing to resolve their disputes in one jurisdiction
instead of another.
This Article first considers the extent to which a patentee is
entitled, under the various Conventions governing jurisdiction
and enforcement,"° to which all EU Member States are signato-
ries, to choose the forum in which to sue for infringement. This
extend to what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a
person skilled in the art, the patentee has contemplated. On the contrary, it is
to be interpreted as defining a position between these extremes which com-
bines a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty
for third parties.
Id. The Protocol's goal is to "strike a balance between two fundamental extremes:
strict literal interpretation and broad guidelines." Hatter, supra note 4, at 472.
6. Hatter, supra note 4, at 471-72.
7. The Remington device was known as the "Smooth & Silky." Improver, [1990]
F.S.R. at 187. The Smooth & Silky contains a small electric motor which is inside a
hand held device. Id. At the top of the Smooth & Silky are a number of parallel slits.
Id. When the top of the Smooth & Silky is held close to the skin and rapidly rotated by
the motor, hairs are gripped between the walls of the slits and are plucked out by the
rotational movement. Id.
8. Compare Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc., 21 IIC 572 (1990), 24 IIC 838
(1993), [1993] GRUR Int. 242 (F.R.G.) (holding that patent was infringed) with Im-
prover, [1990] F.S.R. 181 (Eng. Ch. 1989) (holding that patent was not infringed).
9. Forum shopping occurs "when a party attempts to have his action tried in a
particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judg-
ment or verdict." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
10. The two Conventions are the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ. L 319/9 (1988) [herein-
after Lugano Convention], and the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ. L 299/32 (1972), amended by
O.J. L 304/77 (1978), amended by O.J. L 285/1 (1989) [hereinafter Brussels Conven-
tion] (subsequent citations will be to the full text, English version, at O.J. L 304/77
(1978), unless the cited article has been substantively revised).
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Article then considers the factors which a patentee is likely to
look for when choosing the forum in which to bring proceedings
for infringement. It concludes by considering the extent to
which, bearing these factors in mind, various jurisdictions within
the European Union offer advantages to potential plaintiffs in
infringement actions over other jurisdictions. A comprehensive
comparison of all jurisdictions in the European Union is beyond
the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article will focus primarily
upon the practice and procedure of the courts of the United
Kingdom and Germany, referring briefly to certain other Mem-
ber States of the European Union, namely, France and Italy.
I. JURISDICTION
A. The Governing Conventions
The principal Conventions relevant to the allocation of ju-
risdiction are the Brussels Convention ("Convention")I' and the
Lugano Convention.'" The Lugano Convention effectively ex-
tends the scope of the Convention to the European Free Trade
Association States which ratified it. The provisions of the Con-
vention allow patentees considerable flexibility in choosing a fo-
rum for litigating their disputes. As a result, patentees are often
able to take advantage of the differences between national courts
in resolving patent disputes.
1. The Basic Rule: Defendant's Domicile
The basic rule of the Convention is contained in Article 2
which provides that if the Convention applies, i" a plaintiff must
sue the defendant in the courts of the jurisdiction of the defend-
ant's domicile, and no other court, unless one of several enu-
merated exceptions applies.' 4
11. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, O.J. L 304/77, at 78 (1978).
12. Lugano Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, O.J. L 319/9, at 10 (1988).
13. The Brussels Convention applies when the proceedings brought in the courts
of one of the contracting states relate to "civil and commercial matters" and do not
relate to revenue, customs, or administrative matters or to matters relating to the status
or capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relation-
ship, wills and succession, bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insol-
vent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analo-
gous proceedings, and'social security or arbitration, all of which are specifically ex-
cluded. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, O.J. L 304/77, at 78 (1978).
14. Id. arts. 2-6, O.J. L 304/77, at 78-80 (1978).
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The internal law of the contracting state whose court is ini-
tially considering the matter determines the defendant's domi-
cile for purposes of the Convention." In the case of a company,
its domicile is its "seat."' 6 While not defined in the Convention,
a company's seat is generally either the company's place of in-
corporation and the location where the company has its regis-
tered office or some other official address or the location where
the company's central management and control is exercised.
Under the Convention, therefore, a company may potentially
have more than one seat. It is irrelevant that a plaintiff is domi-
ciled outside a contracting state.
A court is not limited to assuming jurisdiction in cases
where a patent alleged to be infringed is issued in that state. Ar-
ticle 2 of the Convention also allows contracting states to assume
jurisdiction in cases involving the infringement of foreign pat-
ents on the basis of a defendant's domicile. A U.S. company
holding a European patent granted in Germany, England, Italy,
and the Netherlands, may sue an alleged infringer, who is domi-
ciled in France, for infringement of a German patent in the
Netherlands. In patent infringement cases thus far, the Hoge
Raad der Nederlanden ("Hoge Raad"), the highest court in the
Netherlands, has assumed jurisdiction over defendants domi-
ciled in the Netherlands in proceedings for infringement of na-
tional patents derived from a single application filed at the EPO
in Munich, even where the Netherlands was not a designated
contracting state in the European patent application. 7
Allowing a plaintiff to pursue a defendant in a number of
jurisdictions pursuant to one judgment offers the potential to
save considerable amounts on effort and expense. Difficulties,
however, may arise where the scope of the asserted claims, as
interpreted by the national courts, differs between the states in
which enforcement is sought.
2. Exceptions to the Basic Rule
The Convention contains a number of exceptions to the ba-
15. Id. art. 4, OJ. L 304/77, at 79 (1978).
16. Id. art. 16(2), OJ. L 304/77, at 82 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Organon v. ARS, 463 NJ (HR 1996) (confirming decision of Court of
Appeal of The Hague which granted cross-border injunction); Organon Teknika v. Chi-
ron, 15 IER (Hof 1995) (affirming lower court's decision to grant cross-border injunc-
tion); Murex v. Chiron, 83 IER (Hof 1996).
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sic rule for jurisdiction, some of which are particularly relevant
in the context of patent infringement.
a. Interim Relief
In intellectual property disputes, a plaintiff is often primar-
ily concerned about the availability of a preliminary or interim
injunction which restrains a defendant's activities pending full
consideration by a court. The outcome of a motion for a prelim-
inary injunction is often determinative of the issue because the
unsuccessful party usually will not wish to pursue the matter to a
full trial. It is, therefore, clearly advantageous for a plaintiff to
have the freedom to choose the jurisdiction in which to apply for
interim relief.
Article 24 of the Convention provides, "[a]pplication may
be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provi-
sional, including protective, measures as may be available under
the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts
of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the sub-
stance of the matter.""8 This provision applies to applications
made with or without notice to a defendant as well as to post-
judgment applications. The importance of this provision is ex-
emplified by the Dutch Kort Geding procedure,19 which enables
patentees to petition the President of the District Court in The
Hague for either a prohibitory2° or mandatory injunction.21 At
the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff explains the nature of the
plaintiff's claim and the plaintiff's patent agent will, if necessary,
explain the technical aspects of the patent to the court. The
court will decide whether to grant an injunction based on the
merits of the case, attempting to forecast whether the plaintiff
would succeed in the event that the matter proceeded to a full
trial. In Kort Geding proceedings, the District Court and the
18. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 24, OJ. L 304/77, at 83 (1978).
19. Translated literally, it means "short procedure."
20. A prohibitory injunction is a court order directing one party to cease from
doing a certain act. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 785 (6th ed. 1990).
21. A mandatory injunction:
(1) commands the defendant to do some positive act or particular thing; (2)
prohibits him from refusing (or persisting in a refusal) to do or permit some
act to which the plaintiff has a legal right; or (3) restrains the defendant from
permitting his previous wrongful act to continue operative, thus virtually com-
pelling him to undo it.
Id. at 784.
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Hoge Raad have ruled on infringements occurring in foreign ju-
risdictions and granted injunctions with extra-territorial effect.22
It appears that, thus far, the Dutch courts in Kort Geding proceed-
ings have not based jurisdiction on Article 24 alone. Instead,
jurisdiction has, in these cases, been founded under one of the
bases for assuming jurisdiction under the Convention.
Other provisional measures21 fall within the scope of Article
24 of the Convention. Such measures include the English
Mareva injunction 4 and the Anton Piller order.25 In a recent
case, 26 a plaintiff owned patents in France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom but not Belgium or the Netherlands. The de-
fendants conducted the allegedly infringing business in the
countries where the patents existed as well as in Belgium and the
Netherlands. The plaintiff sought and obtained from the Bel-
gian court of first instance, an order for a descriptive seizure.
The defendants appealed the order, arguing that, notwithstand-
ing Article 24 of the Convention, the Belgian court of first in-
stance could not order a descriptive seizure because the plaintiff
had no monopoly rights in Belgium, the territory where the or-
der would be enforced. On appeal, the Belgian Court of Appeal
confirmed the descriptive seizure, stating that courts of con-
tracting states have jurisdiction to order all types of preliminary
measures which leave the merits of the case intact even though
the courts of other states have jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine the merits of the case.2 7
22. See, e.g., Organon, 463 NJ (HR 1996) (confirming decision of Court of Appeal
of The Hague which granted cross-border injunction); Organon Teknika, 15 IER (Hof
1995) (affirming lower court's decision to grant cross-border injunction); Murex, 83
IER (Hof 1996).
23. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 24, O.J. L 304/77, at 83 (1978).
24. The Mareva Injunction is an injunction which prohibits a defendant from dis-
posing of its assets.
25. An Anton Piller order is obtained ex parte and "requires the defendant to permit
the plaintiff, with his solicitor, to enter named premises and search them for and re-
move evidence of infringement, and/or to disclose the names of his suppliers of and
customers for infringing articles." PETER STONE, COPYRIGHT LAw IN THE UNITED KING-
DOM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 92 (1990).
26. Variantsystement A/S v. Sanac Belgium and Sanac Fyto, Court of Appeal,
Ghent, Belgium, Nov. 17, 1995, noted in (1996] 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. D-66.
27. Id.
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b. Alternative Fora to Defendant's Domicile
i. The Lex Locus Delecti Rule2 8
Patent infringement is a tort. Article 5(3) of the Conven-
tion provides, "[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may,
in another Contracting State, be sued:... (3) in matters relating
to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where
the harmful event occurred."29 In Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B. V v.
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A.,3 ° the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") interpreted this phrase in a manner which gives plain-
tiffs the option- of commencing proceedings either where the
event giving rise to the damage occurred or in the jurisdiction
where the damage occurred.31 In Bier, the defendant company
discharged saline waste into the Rhine River in Alsace, France.
The discharge flowed downstream, causing damage to the plain-
tiff company's seed beds in the Netherlands. The plaintiff com-
menced proceedings in the Netherlands. The Dutch court of
first instance, the Dutch Court declined jurisdiction on the basis
that the case was not covered by Article 5(3) of the Convention.
The plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Court referred the mat-
ter to the ECJ. The ECJ held that under Article 5(3), either the
Dutch or French courts had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 2
Bier appears to enable a prospective plaintiff to commence
proceedings for the infringement of a patent in jurisdictions
where the infringing product is produced or wherever it is circu-
lated. For example, if a German company manufactured prod-
ucts in France which infringed a European patent issued in Ger-
many, France, and Italy, French Courts apparently could assume
jurisdiction under Article 4(3).3 If these products were sold in
Italy, the Italian Courts could also assume jurisdiction under Ar-
28. Lex locus deledi is a choice of law rule according to which the law of the place of
the wrong governs the action. BLACK'S LAw DicrioNARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3), OJ. L 304/77, at 79 (1978).
30. Case 21/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1735, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 284.
31. Id. at 1747-48, [1977], 1 C.M.L.R. at 300-01.
32. Id. at 1748, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 301. The Court explained, "[t]he result is
that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for
the place where the damage occurred or in the courts for the place of the event which
gives rise to and is at the origin of that damage." Id.
33. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3), O.J. L 304/77, at 79 (1978). Arti-
cle 5(3) grants jurisdiction according to the place of manufacture of the infringing
products. Id.
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ticle 5(3).
There have been a number of cases, however, involving the
application of Article 5 (3) to intellectual property rights disputes
which suggest that there may be limits to a plaintiffs right to
forum shop in patent disputes in reliance on Article 5(3). In the
case of ABKCO v. MCI,35 a plaintiff claimed to be the owner of
various sound recordings of the popular singer Sam Cooke. The
second defendant, a Danish corporation, granted the first de-
fendant a license to manufacture and sell copies of the sound
recordings in the United Kingdom and Ireland. The plaintiff
initiated proceedings against the second defendant in England,
arguing that it had authorized the first defendant's infringe-
ments. The plaintiff brought the proceedings against the sec-
ond defendant pursuant to Articles 5(3) and 6(1). On appeal,
the English Court of Appeal held that the English court had ju-
risdiction to hear the dispute under Articles 5(3) and 6(1).16
In KiTechnology v. Unicor3 plaintiff companies sued in Eng-
land for breach of contracts concerning the use of confidential
information relating to the manufacture of multi-layer compos-
ite plastic and aluminium pipes. All the defendants were Ger-
man companies and the misuse of trade secrets complained of
occurred in Germany. The agreements containing the confiden-
tiality clauses also included provisions stipulating that English
courts and English law governed any disputes. The plaintiffs is-
sued and served a writ on the defendants alleging breach of con-
tract and misuse of confidential information. The defendants
applied to have the writ set aside on the grounds that the Eng-
lish courts lacked jurisdiction.
At first instance, the court held that the English courts had
jurisdiction under Article 5(3). The Court of Appeal, however,
held that even if the misuse of confidential information was a
matter relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict,38 the plaintiff still
had to demonstrate that the United Kingdom was the place
34. Id. Article 5(3) of the Convention likewise grants jurisdiction to the state in
which the infringing goods were circulated. Id.
35. [1995] E.M.L.R. 449 (CA. 1994).
36. Id. at 451-52.
37. KiTechnology v. Unicor, [1995] F.S.R. 765 (C.A. 1994).
38. The English Court of Appeal could not express any view on a quasi-delict tort
because an indistinguishable case had been referred to the European Court ofJustice
("ECJ"). Id. at 767.
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where "the harmful event [had] occurred".3 9 The court had to
distinguish between damage the misuse of information directly
caused, which would establish jurisdiction, and damage it indi-
rectly caused, which would not serve as a basis for jurisdiction.
In this case, the plaintiff failed to show that it had suffered any
direct loss in England as a result of the misuse of confidential
information. The court, therefore, held that Article 5(3) could
not ground jurisdiction.'
In Marinari v. Lloyds Bank Pic.,41 a case before the ECJ that
did not involve intellectual property rights, a plaintiff placed
promissory notes with an exchange value of over US$750 million
with a branch of Lloyds Bank in Manchester, England. The
notes were issued by a province of the Philippines in favor of the
Zubaidi Trading Company of Beirut. Upon opening the envel-
ope that contained the promissory notes, the bank staff became
suspicious of the origin of the notes and called the police. The
police arrested the plaintiff and his promissory notes were se-
questered.
The plaintiff brought proceedings in Italy against the bank,
claiming repayment of the promissory notes and compensation
for breach of several contracts and injury to his reputation. The
bank challenged the jurisdiction of the Italian court, the
Tribunale di Pisa, on the ground that the alleged damage oc-
curred in England. The court requested a preliminary ruling
from the ECJ on whether the place where the harmful event oc-
curred in Article 5(3) meant only the place in which physical
harm was caused to persons or things or whether it also included
the place where damage to the plaintiff's assets occurred.42
The ECJ construed Article 5(3) so as not to negate the gen-
eral principle laid down in Article 2.4s The place where the
harmful event occurred could not, therefore, be construed so
extensively that it encompassed any place where the adverse con-
sequences of an harmful event could be felt.4" The ECJ under-
stood the phrase as not referring to the place where the victim
claimed to have suffered financial loss consequential to initial
39. Id. at 777.
40. Id. at 780.
41. Case C-364/93, 2 T.L.R. 159 (Eur. Ct. J. 1996).
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id. at 168.
44. Id.
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damage arising and suffered by him in another contracting state.
The ECJ, therefore, suggested that in the context of patent dis-
putes, a patentee will need to show a real and direct connection
between the defendant's activities and the harm suffered in a
particular state before the courts of that state will find jurisdic-
tion under Article 5(3).
Where jurisdiction is founded on the fact that infringing
products are made within that territory, it would appear that a
court could rule on any harm which occurred as a result, even if
the harm is extra-territorial.45 Where jurisdiction is grounded
merely on the basis of the circulation of the infringing goods
within the jurisdiction, however, a court is constrained to rule
only on the harm occurring within the jurisdiction.
Article 5(3) does not give a court in one contracting state
jurisdiction to rule on patent infringement that occurred in an-
other contracting state. Such jurisdiction is only possible where
jurisdiction has been founded pursuant to Article 2. In that
case, a court can rule on the infringement of a parallel patent
granted in another jurisdiction and apply the laws of that juris-
diction. For example, if a defendant who is domiciled in the
Netherlands is sued for the infringement of a European patent
issued in France and Germany, Dutch courts have jurisdiction,
by virtue of Article 2, to hear the dispute. Where a plaintiff com-
mences proceedings in France pursuant to Article 5(3), how-
ever, the French courts may only assume jurisdiction in respect
to infringement of the French patent.
ii. Branch, Agency, or Other Establishment
Article 5(5) of the Convention provides:
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
Contracting State, be sued: . . . (5) [A]s regards a dispute
arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other
establishment, in the courts for the place in which the
branch, agency or other establishment is situated.4"
In Somafer S.A. v. Saar-Ferngas A. G.,4 the ECJ decided a case
in which the plaintiff was a French company and the defendant a
45. This has long been the rule under English law. See Watson Laidlaw & Co. v.
Pott, Cassels & Williamson, [1914] 31 R.P.C. 104 (H.L. 1914).
46. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(5), OJ. L 304/77, at 79 (1978).
47. Case 33/78, [1978] E.C.R. 2183, [1979], 1 C.M.L.R. 490.
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German corporation. The plaintiff sought to sue the defendant
in Germany and argued that the defendant had a branch office
in the Saarland, Germany, partly on the basis that the defend-
ant's notepaper provided a Saarland address for its German rep-
resentative.4" The ECJ held that for Article 5(5) to apply, two
basic conditions need to be satisfied. The existence of a branch
office must be established, and a sufficiently close connection
must be demonstrated between it and the cause of action.49 As
far as the first requirement was concerned, the ECJ said that the
party seeking to demonstrate a branch must show that there is a
place of business in the territory of the forum, which has the
appearance of permanency, that it has management, and, that it
is materially equipped to negotiate business with third parties so
that they would not have to deal direct with the head office. 50 As
far as the second requirement was concerned, it is satisfied, inter
alia, where the dispute concerned tortious acts arising from the
activities of the branch. It is, therefore, possible that if the exist-
ence of a branch or agent within a jurisdiction can be estab-
lished, selling or offering for sale products which infringe a pat-
ent registered in that jurisdiction may be used to found jurisdic-
tion against the manufacturer of those articles even if domiciled
in a different contracting state.
iii. Where There Are Co-Defendants
Article 6(1) appears to provide a plaintiff the option of su-
ing several defendants in the courts of the contracting state
where any one of them is domiciled. Article 6(1) of the Conven-
tion reads, "[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may also
be sued: (1) [W]here he is one of a number of defendants, in
the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled."51
The EGJ, however, in Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schrdder, Munchmeyer,
Hengst & Co.,52 held that courts must interpret Article 6(1) and
Article 5(3) restrictively. 53  Some relationship between the
claims against each defendant must be established, 4 including,
48. Id. at 2185, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 492.
49. Id. at 2194, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 499-500.
50. Id. at 2192, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 501-03.
51. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 6(1), OJ. L 304/77, at 79 (1978).
52. Case 189/87, [1988] E.C.R. 5579, [1990] 2 C.E.C. (CCH) 22.
53. Id. at 5584-86.
54. Id. at 5584.
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by showing that the multiple defendants were acting in collu-
sion, such that it is expedient to adjudicate them together to
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments that may result from
otherwise separate proceedings. A court should not assume ju-
risdiction under Article 6(1) where it appears that a plaintiff is
deliberately attempting to deprive a defendant of its normal fo-
rum.
55
iv. The Place Where the Patent Is Registered Governs
Validity Disputes
Typically, where patent infringement is alleged, the defend-
ant will seek, by way of counterclaim or, in jurisdictions where
issues of validity and infringement are addressed independently
of each other in separate revocation or nullity proceedings, to
revoke the patent for invalidity. Articles 16(4)56 and 195" of the
Convention provide that questions of the registration and valid-
ity of registered intellectual property rights must be addressed by
the courts of the contracting state where the registration has oc-
curred or has been applied for. A potential conflict, therefore,
arises under the Convention in cases where infringement pro-
ceedings are commenced in the courts of a defendant's domicile
with respect to a patent granted in another state and where the
patent's validity is challenged by the defendant in the infringe-
ment action.
Such situations could result in a situation where the judg-
ments are not recognized under Article 27(3) of the Conven-
tion on the grounds of irreconcilability. It has been suggested
that to avoid irreconcilable judgments, the court before which
the infringement proceedings have been brought should stay
those proceedings unless the attack on the validity of the patent
is thought to have been brought in bad faith or there is some
other good reason for not staying the proceedings.59
55. See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 6(1), OJ. L 204/77, at 79 (1978).
56. Id. art. 16(4), O.J. L 304/77, at 82 (1978).
57. Id. art. 19, OJ. L 304/77, at 83 (1978).
58. Id. art. 27(3), O.J. L 304/77, at 84 (1978).
59. John Adams, Choice of Forum in Patent Disputes, [1995] EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv.
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v. The Patentee's Place of Residence Governs
Ownership Disputes
The Convention does not contain any specific provisions
governing disputes over the ownership of intellectual property
rights. As far as European patents are concerned, however, in
the case of disputes under the EPC concerning the ownership of
a patent granted under the EPC, two courts can potentially have
jurisdiction. The first are the courts of the contracting state
where the applicant for the patent has his residence or principal
place of business.60 The second set of courts which might have
exclusive jurisdiction are the courts of the state in which the
party suing for infringement of the patent has its residence or
principle place of business, provided the applicant does not re-
side or have a place of business in any contracting state.61 This
rule does not apply to disputes between an employer and em-
ployee.
3. Applicable Law
When the courts of one contracting state assume jursidic-
tion in a case involving the infringement of a patent issued in
another state, the law of the state which granted the patent ap-
plies. For example, a German corporation may be sued in Ger-
many regarding the infringement of a French patent. The Ger-
man Court, however, must apply French law.
4. Recognition and Enforcement
Are the courts in states affected by an injunction which was
granted in another state bound to enforce it? Articles 2562 and
2663 of the Convention provide that a judgment given in one
contracting state must be recognized in another. Moreover, the
Convention does not distinguish between preliminary and final
judgments. A defaultjudgment will not be recognized in certain
circumstances. Article 27 provides, "[a] judgment shall not be
recognised... (2)where it was given in default of appearance, if
the defendant was not duly served with the document which in-
60. Protocol on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Decisions in Respect of the
Right to the Grant of a European Patent, Oct. 5, 1973, § 1 arts. 1-8 (1973).
61. Id.
62. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 25, OJ. L 304/77, at 83-84 (1978).
63. Id. art. 26, OJ. L 304/77, at 84 (1978).
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stituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in suffi-
cient time to enable him to arrange for his defence."64
Article 24, however, governs the position with regard to en-
forcement of ex parte orders.65 In Bernard Denilauler v. S.n.c.
Couchet Freres,66 the ECJ decided a case in which the plaintiff was
French and the defendant German. The action was brought in a
French court and the plaintiff applied ex parte for an order freez-
ing the defendant's bank account in Germany. The French
court granted the order without informing the defendant and
the plaintiff then brought proceedings to enforce it in Germany.
The defendant referred the matter to the ECJ arguing that the
order was unenforceable because it violated Article 27(2). The
ECJ held that Article 27(2) did not apply to ex parte proceed-
ings.67 Instead, it only applied to adversarial proceedings where
the law of the country granting judgment requires the defendant
to be notified in advance. 68
This case does not mean, however, that parties cannot en-
force ex parte orders under the Convention. The ECJ held that ex
parte interim orders were not intended to come within the provi-
sions of the Convention dealing with recognition.6 9 Instead,
plaintiffs should bring fresh proceedings under Article 24 of the
Convention in the country where enforcement is required. An
interim order, such as a Mareva injunction, will be enforceable
only if a defendant is informed in advance of the hearing and
given the opportunity to present his case. In most cases, how-
ever, putting a defendant on notice of such proceedings would
enable him to dispose of his assets and, therefore, frustrate the
purpose of the procedure. Alternatively, when a defendant has
assets within the jurisdiction of the court making the order, pen-
alties for failure to comply with the order in another state can be
assessed against those assets.
With regard to the Dutch Kort Geding procedure, a question
exists as to whether the procedure should be regarded as a provi-
sional measure 70 under Article 24 of the Convention. While cer-
64. Id. art. 27, O.J. L 304/77, at 84 (1978).
65. Id. art. 24, O.J. L 304/77, at 83 (1978).
66. Case 125/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1553, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 62.
67. Id. at 1568, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. at 79.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 24, O.J. L 304/77, at 83 (1978).
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tain features of the procedure resemble a preliminary injunction
application, it is a unique procedure. The Kort Ceding procedure
does not provide provisional relief. Rather, the finding of the
court is final and binding.
A judgment also may not be recognized by another con-
tracting state if it is contrary to public policy7' or is irreconcilable
with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in
the same state in which recognition is sought.72 As explained
above, these exceptions inadequately cover the range of possible
conflicts which may result from courts in different jurisdictions
ruling on infringement and validity.
B. Relevant Factors for Patentee
Of primary importance to a patentee in deciding the forum
in which to bring proceedings is whether litigating in one forum
as opposed to another will enhance his potential for a successful
outcome. A number of factors influence the likelihood of suc-
cess, such as, the procedural rules of the court, including the
availability of specialist judges, documentary discovery, and
cross-examination at trial and the test for infringement applied
in the courts of that forum.
Other factors relevant to a prospective plaintiffs decision
concerning where to sue include the availability of speedy relief
through a preliminary injunction or expedited trials, other po-
tentially available interim relief,73 and the availability of extra-
territorial injunctions. Another factor which can become signifi-





The United Kingdom is made up of three separate jurisdic-
tions, England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The
only court in England with the jurisdiction to try patent disputes
71. Id. arts. 27(1), 28, OJ. L 304/77, at 84 (1978).
72. Id. art. 27(3), OJ. L 304/77, at 84 (1978).
73. These might include Anton Piller and Mareva injunctions.
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is the Patents Court,14 a specially constituted part of the High
Court in London. Patent practitioners believe the Patents Court
is unique in Europe. As an alternative to the Patents Court, the
United Kingdom established the Patents County Court in 1990
to provide a forum for small to medium-sized enterprises to re-
solve disputes involving patents for lower-grade technology or
older technology. These two courts have judges who have con-
siderable experience in dealing with patent disputes and are ex-
perienced patent practitioners. On the other hand, the English
courts are an inappropriate forum for a patentee to bring a weak
case in the hope of misleading the court and achieving a legally
incorrect result.
The English system, unlike those of its continental Euro-
pean counterparts, involves documentary discovery, which oper-
ates as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, such discovery may
assist the patentee in proving infringement, but, on the other
hand, may provide a defendant with useful information with
which to attack the validity of the patent.75 At trial, witnesses are
cross-examined concerning their written evidentiary statements.
b. The Test for Infringement
The starting point for consideration of the test for infringe-
ment under English law is Section 125 (1) of the Patents Act 1977
("the 1977 Act"). 76 The 1977 Act provides:
For the purposes of this Act an invention for a patent for
which an application has been made or for which a patent
has been granted shall, unless the context otherwise requires,
be taken to be that specified in a claim of the specification of
the application or patent, as the case may be, as interpreted
by the description and any drawings contained in that specifi-
cation, and the extent of the protection conferred by a patent
74. The Patents Court was established under Section 96 of the 1977 Patents Act.
Patents Act, 1977, PUBLIC GENERAL ACrs AND MEASURES of 1977, Ch. 37, § 96, at 644-45
(Eng.) [hereinafter 1977 Patents Act]. Patent disputes have been assigned to specialist
patent judges since the 1950s.
75. The basic requirement on the patentee where obviousness, e.g., lack of an in-
ventive step, is alleged, is to provide discovery of non-privileged documents for a period
of two years before and after the priority date. Rules of the Supreme Court, THE
SUPREME COURT PRAciCE, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, Order 104, Rule 11(2)(b) (1997) [hereinafter
RSC].
76. 1977 Patents Act, supra note 74, at § 125(1).
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or application for a patent shall be determined accordingly. 77
Section 125(1) of the 1977 Act has the same effect as Article
69 of the EPC. Section 125(3) of the 1977 Act provides that the
Protocol on the interpretation of Article 69 of the EPC applies to
Section 125(1) in the same manner as it does to Article 69.78
The Protocol, in turn, states:
Article 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the ex-
tent of the protection conferred by a European Patent is to be
understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of
the wording used in the claims, the description and drawings
being employed only for the purpose of resolving an ambigu-
ity if found in the claims. Neither should it be interpreted in
the sense that the claims serve only as a guideline and that
the actual protection may extend to what, from a considera-
tion of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the
art, the patentee has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to
be interpreted as defining a position between these extremes
which combines a fair protection for the patentee with a rea-
sonable degree of certainty for third parties.
79
The current approach of the English courts regarding the
issue of patent infringement was set forth by Lord Diplock in
Catnic Components v. Hill & Smith."° In Catnic, Lord Diplock in-
troduced the notion of "purposive construction.""1 In Catnic,
the patented invention related to galvanized steel lintels for
doors and windows for use in cavity walls. It was a technological
breakthrough in the industry and a great commercial success,
providing an alternative to much heavier lintels. Its resilience
depended upon the particular formation of certain steel plates
which appear in cross-section in Figure 1. Claim one of the pat-
ent read:
A lintel for use over apertures in cavity walls having an inner
and outer skin comprising a first horizontal plate or part
adapted to support a course or a plurality of superimposed
units forming part of the inner skin and a second horizontal
plate or part substantially parallel to the first and spaced
therefrom in a downward vertical direction and adapted to
77. Id.
78. Id. § 125(3).
79. Protocol, supra note 5, art. 69, 13 I.L.M. at 348.
80. [1982) R.P.C. 183 (H.L 1980).
81. Id. at 243.
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span the cavity in the cavity wall and be supported at least at
each end thereof upon courses forming parts of the outer
and inner skins respectively of the cavity wall adjacent an ap-
erture and a first rigid inclined support member extending
downwardly and forwardly from or near the front edge adja-
cent to the cavity of the first horizontal plate or part and
forming with the second plate or part at an intermediate posi-
tion which lies between the front and rear edge of the second
plate or part and adapted to extend across the cavity, and a
second rigid support member extending vertically from or
from near the rear edge of the first horizontal plate or part to
join with the second plate or part adjacent its rear edge. 82
The primary dispute in Catnic revolved around construction of
the rear supporting member because claim one required that it
should extend vertically.83 The variant in the defendant's lintel,
shown in Figure 2, inclined 6" or 8* from the vertical.
FIGuRE 1 FiuRE 2
82. Id. at 188.
83. Id.
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The House of Lords held that the defendant's lintel in-
fringed the patent." To determine patent infringement, the
House of Lords held that a court must ask itself:
[W]hether persons with practical knowledge and experience
of the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be
used, would understand that strict compliance with a particu-
lar descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was in-
tended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the
invention so that any variant would fall outside the monopoly
claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon
the way the invention worked. 5
The Court held that the term "extending vertically" was capable
of meaning "near enough to vertical to enable the back plate to
perform satisfactorily all the functions it could perform if it were
precisely vertical."86 The Court held, further, that it would be
obvious to an ordinary builder that the patentee had not in-
tended to make exact verticality of the back plate an essential
feature of the invention.
The patent in Catnic was granted under the Patents Act
1949 ("1949 Act") 88 and the case was, therefore, concerned with
the law prior to the enactment of the 1977 Act, which embodied
the provisions of the EPC. It has been held in a number of
cases,"9 however, that the "purposive" approach in Catnic ac-
corded with the Protocol and should, therefore, apply to cases
decided under the 1977 Act.
In Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., the
plaintiffs invented and patented a depilatory device. Claim one
of the patent at issue read:
An electrically powered depilatory device comprising: a hand
held portable housing (2); motor means (4, 4') disposed in
said housing; and a helical spring (24) comprising a plurality
84. Id. at 244-45.
85. Id. at 243.
86. Id. at 244.
87. Id.
88. Patents Act, 1949, 2 GR. BRrr. STATUTm, Ch. 87, 1725 (Eng.).
89. See, e.g., Anchor Building Prods. Ltd. v. Redland Roof Tiles Ltd., [1990] R.P.C.
283 (C.A. 1988); Strix Ltd. v. Otter Controls Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 354 (C.A. 1991); A.C.
Edwards Ltd. v. Acme Signs & Displays Ltd., [1992] R.P.C. 131 (C.A. 1991); Southco
Inc. v. Dzus Fastener (Europe) Ltd., [1992] R.P.C. 299 (CA 1991); Optical Coating
Laboratory Inc. v. Pilkington PE Ltd., [1993] F.S.R. 310 (Eng. Ch. 1992); Conoco Spe-
cialty Prods. Inc. v. Merpro Montassa Ltd., [1994] F.S.R. 99 (Eng. Ch. 1990).
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of adjacent windings arranged to be driven by said motor
means in rotational sliding motion relative to skin bearing
hair to be removed, said helical spring (24) including an ar-
cuate hair engaging portion arranged to define a convex side
whereat the windings are spread apart and a concave side cor-
responding thereto whereat the windings are pressed to-
gether, the rotational motion of the helical spring (24) pro-
ducing continuous motion of the windings from a spread
apart orientation at the convex side to a pressed together ori-
entation on the concave side and for the engagement and
plucking of hair from the skin of the subject, whereby the
surface velocities of the windings relative to the skin greatly
exceed the surface velocity of the housing relative thereto.90
The plaintiffs marketed an embodiment of the device under the
name "Epilady" as shown in Figure 3. The defendants produced
A-









-- ;---4,-- - r-
FIGURE 3
90. Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at 187.
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a rival device known as "Smooth and Silky."91 Instead of a helical
metal spring, the feature attached to the motor and a rod of
synthetic rubber, which partially extended through slits, was
used to extract hair. The arcuate form of the rod caused the slits
to open on the convex side of the product and be pressed to-
gether on the concave side. When the rod was rotated at high
speed and held close to the skin, hair entered the gaps on its
convex side and were gripped between the walls of the slits as the
rotational movement brought them round to the concave side.
For this variant, a U.S. patent had been granted.92
The issue of patent infringement, therefore, hinged upon
whether the rubber rod was equivalent to a "helical spring" as
that expression was used in the claims. Justice Hoffman stated
that the correct approach was the one Lord Diplock set out in
Catnic.93 He proceeded to state that if the issue was whether a
feature present in a product allegededly infringing a patent,
which fell outside the primary, literal, or contextual meaning of
a descriptive word or phrase in the claim, i.e., a variant, but was
nevertheless within the claim's language if properly interpreted,
a court should ask itself the following three questions:
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the
invention works? If yes, the variant is outside the claim.
If no -
(2) Would this [fact] (i.e., that the variant had no material
effect) have been obvious at the date of publication of the
patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the variant is
outside the claim. If yes -
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have un-
derstood from the language of the claim that the patentee
intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning
was an essential requirement of the invention. If yes, the vari-
ant is outside the claim.94
On the other hand, a negative answer to the last question would
lead to the conclusion that the patentee intended the word or
phrase to have a figurative, and not a literal meaning. Conse-
quently, the word or phrase would denote a class of things which
91. Id.
92. Id. at 188.
93. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (describing methodology Lord
Diplock employed in arriving at result in Catmic).
94. Id. at 189.
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included the variant and the literal meaning, the latter being
perhaps the most perfect, best-known, or striking example of the
class.
Thus, although the English courts and the courts of other
European contracting states have enacted the same test of in-
fringement derived from Article 69 of the EPC and the Protocol,
the English court, in Improver, arrived at a different conclusion
concerning patent infringement than did all other European ju-
risdictions in which parallel proceedings were brought. The
English court held that the patent was not infringed, while else-
where, the patent was held to have been infringed.9"
Improver is often cited as evidence for the argument that the
English test for patent infringement is less favorable to patentees
than is the test of other jurisdictions. In PLG Research Limited v.
Ardon International Limited,96 the English Court of Appeal re-
viewed the English approach and the German approach and
concluded that the latter was more in conformity with the Proto-
col than the Catnic test, which the court stated in dicta, should
no longer be followed.9" Both Justice Aldous, in the English Pat-
ents Court in Assidoman Multipack Limited v. The Mead Corpora-
tion,98 and Lord Justice Aldous, in the English Court of Appeal
in Kastner v. Rizla Limited9 9 realized, however, that the English
Court of Appeal's comments in PLG were irrelevant to the
court's final decision and, therefore, obiter dictum.' Thus, the
test in Catnic remained the most appropriate test.
When a dispute concerns the alleged infringement of a pat-
ent by a product which has features that are modifications or
equivalents of the features in the patent, litigation of the same
case in different countries can lead to different results. The ap-
proach taken by the courts regarding the proper test for patent
infringement in such cases is, therefore, clearly a relevant factor
for patentees. While English judges have traditionally construed
95. See, e.g., Beska Nederland B.V. & Remington Prods. Inc. v. Improver Corp., 21
IIC 572, 586, 589 (1993); Improver Corp. v. Raymond Indus. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 422
(Sup. Ct. Hong Kong 1989); Improver Corp. v. Raymond Indus. Ltd., (1991] F.S.R. 233
(C.A. Hong Kong 1990); Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc., 21 IIC 572 (1990),
24 IIC 838 (1993), [1993] GRUR Int. 242 (F.R.G.).
96. [1995] F.S.R. 116 (CA 1994).
97. Id. at 129-34.
98. [1995] F.S.R. 225 (Eng. Ch. 1994).
99. [1995] R.P.C. 585 (CA 1995).
100. Assidoman, [1995] F.S.R. at 236; Kastner, [1995] R.P.C. at 594.
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the monopoly by reference to the claims, their continental Euro-
pean counterparts, who follow civil law traditions, have tended
to grant patentees much wider protection, protecting technical
expressions of the idea underlying a patent and finding infringe-
ment in a wide range of equivalent products.
In the English Improver case, Justice Hoffman observed that
the Dusseldorf Landgericht, the Dusseldorf trial court trying the
parallel German Improver case, treated the claims as a mere
guideline rather than adopting the median course as required
by the Protocol.'' In addition, Justice Hoffman's approach dif-
fered from the views expressed in the German Court of Appeals
which, during an application for a preliminary injunction,
placed more emphasis on the language of the claims and found
no patent infringement.
In Kastner,102 it is arguable that the protection granted to
the patentee was more generous than the protection granted to
patentees in previous English cases. In Kastner, it was not merely
a word or phrase in the patent claims which was construed pur-
posively, as opposed to Catnic's interpretation of "vertical" and
Improver's interpretation of "helical spring", but rather five of the
nine features of claim one of the patent were construed purpos-
ively. 1 03
The July 4, 1996 volume of Reports of Patent Cases contains
reports of two actions,0 4 one in the English Patents Court and
one in the Munich Landgericht, the Munich trial court, involv-
ing corresponding patents of Mabuchi Motor relating to brush
arms for the commutators of electric motors and deriving prior-
ity from a Japanese utility model. The counter-party in both ac-
tions was Johnson Electric, a Hong Kong company, and, like
Mabuchi, one of the world's leading designers of small electric
motors.
One issue common to both actions concerned interpreta-
tion of the patent claim's wording, which read in the U.K. pat-
ent, "4. Brush gear .... wherein said first and second strips are
connected together by means of a plurality of projections ex-
101. Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at 198.
102. Kastner, [1995] R.P.C. 181.
103. Id. at 597.
104. Mabuchi Motor KK.'s Patent, [1996] R.P.C. 387 (Eng. Ch. 1995); Johnson
Elec. Indus. Manufactory Ltd. v. Mabuchi Motor Co., [1996] R.P.C. 411 (BayObLGZ
1995).
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tending sideways of said strip."105 The Johnson Motor's inven-
tion comprised of a single projection. Did it thereby avoid in-
fringement by the requirement of a plurality or was it in sub-
stance two projections and, therefore, within claim four?
Both the English and the German courts, applying Article
69 and the Protocol, arrived at opposite conclusions. The Eng-
lish case was decided on July 25, 1995106 and the Munich case on
September 7, 1995.107 In the English High Court, Justice Jacob
said:
Nonetheless, I think that the skilled man would have to con-
clude that by the very word plurality the patentee had, for
some reason or other excluded just a single projection. The
language of the claim would indicate to him that the patentee
had intended that strict compliance with the primary mean-
ing of plurality (i.e., more than one) was an essential require-
ment.
But I am not concerned with a complete single flap, I
have got a flap with a relief hole drilled in it. Moreover that
flap is, in due course, bent over so as to provide a sandwich
on either side of the bend of the L, just as in the patent. I
have come to the conclusion that the skilled man would re-
gard that either as in substance two flaps or as an immaterial
variant from two flaps. He would not regard the language of
that claim as excluding this variant. Such an exclusion would
serve no purpose. He would see that there is projection from
the terminal portion on either side of the hole, serving the
purpose of the plurality of the claim. Accordingly, on this
point I think that the Johnson Mark 2 falls within the
claim.108
By contrast, the headnote of the Munich judgment reads:
(3) If the Plaintiff in the counter-action wished to obtain pro-
tection for a design using only one projection, it would have
used the wording "one or more projections." A "plurality of
projections" meant two or more projections and, although it
was not defined where the plurality of projections was to be
located, the figures in the patent suggested a bilateral ar-
rangement. Accordingly, the patent was not literally in-
fringed because the first characterising feature of claim one,
105. Mabuchi Motor K.K.'s Patent, [1996] R.P.C. at 396.
106. Id. at 387.
107. Mabuchi Motor Co., [1996] R.P.C. at 411.
108. Mabuchi Motor K.K's Patent, [1996] R.P.C. at 407-08 (emphasis in original).
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a gripping bar or commutator wiper bar possessing a plurality
of projections, was not readable onto the Johnson device.
The hole in the Johnson device did not divide the flap into
two parts since the radius of the hole was small compared
with the width of the flap.
(4) The obstacle created by the clear exclusion of one projec-
tion could not be overcome by the doctrine of equivalence.
On the question of equivalence sight should not be lost of the
scope of the claim and something expressly excluded could
not be recouped using that doctrine. Accordingly there was
no equivalent infringement.109
Because the issue of infringement under Article 69 of the Proto-
col has not been considered by the House of Lords, the com-
ments of the Court of Appeal in Kastner are unlikely to be the
last word on the subject. There has already been an indication
from the House of Lords that it would be highly undesirable for
the provisions of the EPC to be construed differently in the EPO
than they have been interpreted in the national courts of a con-
tracting state. This was stated in the context of interpretation of
Article 54 of the EPC which broadly defines the concept of nov-
elty. 110 Corresponding to Article 54 of the EPC is Section 2 of
the 1977 Act as evidenced by the decision in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals v. Norton."' The following passage is taken from
the judgment of Lord Hoffmann, who, in the Merrell Dow case,
deliberately took a different view on infringement than the Dus-
seldorf Landgericht.
It is therefore the duty of the United Kingdom courts to con-
strue section 2 so that, so far as possible, it has the same effect
as Article 54. For this purpose, it must have regard to the
decisions of the European Patent Office on the construction
of the EPC. These decisions are not strictly binding upon
courts in the United Kingdom but they are of great persuasive
authority; first, because they are the decisions of expert
courts (the Boards of Appeal and Enlarged Board of Appeal
of the EPO) involved daily in the administration of the EPC
and secondly, because it would be highly undesirable for the
provisions of the EPC to be construed differently in the EPO
from the way they are interpreted in the national courts of a
109. Mabuchi Motor Co., [1996] R.P.C. at 412.
110. EPC, supra note 4, art. 54, 13 I.L.M. at 286. Basically, an invention is novel, "if
it does not form part of the state of the art." Id.
111. [1996] R.P.C. 76 (H.L. 1995).
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Contracting State.11
2
It is one thing, however, to seek to reconcile the approach
of the EPO with that of the national courts of the contracting
states in the context of the granting procedure, but another to
expect a total convergence of approaches on issues of construc-
tion or infringement. This is particularly true where the proce-
dural systems differ as they do between the common law ap-
proach in the United Kingdom and the civil law approach in
continental Europe. The Hong Kong Appeal Court in the Im-
prover case observed that, although the claims in substantive law
were the same in England and Germany, the evidence before the
respective courts was not the same. 113 Thus, total uniformity will
probably only be achieved if and when there is a European court
which will decide such matters for all EPC signatory countries. It
is, of course, precisely the aim of the Community Patent Conven-
tion' 14 that the Community Patent Appeal Court will achieve the
uniformity thus far shown to be absent in the Improver and
Mabuchi cases.
c. The Availability of Preliminary Injunctions
The English Courts have long had the authority to grant a
preliminary injunction to restrain an alleged infringement until
the tribunal's decision. From an early date, the apparent
strength of a plaintiff's rights was a major factor which a court
considered in determining whether the court should grant an
injunction.
Over time, however, it appeared that some courts took the
view that a plaintiff must demonstrate a strong prima facie case.
In fact, some courts approached the decision of whether to grant
a preliminary injunction with the conception that there were
strict parameters or rules which governed when they should and
112. Id., [1996] R.P.C. at 82.
113. Improver Corp. v. Raymond Indus. Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 233 (C.A. Hong Kong
1990).
114. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market of 15 Decem-
ber 1975, OJ. L 17/1 (1976), amended by the Implementing Regulations to the Conven-
tion for the European Patent for the Common Market, OJ. L. 401/28 (1989). The as
yet unenacted Community Patent Convention would provide for a single patent effec-
tive throughout Europe. John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier:
Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
277, 298 (1996).
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should not be granted, thus, providing the court with little room
to maneuver.
Since 1974, it has been assumed that the correct principles
for courts to apply in determining whether to grant an interlocu-
tory injunction were those enunciated in American Cyanamid Co.
v. Ethicon Ltd. 115 This case involved the alleged infringement of
the main claim in the plaintiffs patent for surgical sutures.
Ethicon argued that its sutures did not fall within the scope of
the claim of the patent, and, thus, it did not infringe the patent.
In the alternative, Ethicon argued that if the claim was construed
broadly enough to include its product, the plaintiff's patent was
invalid. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction. At first
instance,Justice Graham found that the plaintiff had made out a
strong primafacie case and held that the balance of convenience
favored the grant of a preliminary injunction.116
In the Court of Appeal, Russell, L.J., with whom the other
members of the Court agreed, declared, "if there be no prima
facie case on the point essential to entitle the plaintiff to com-
plain of the defendant's proposed activities, that is the end of
the claim to [preliminary] relief." 7 After a review of the con-
flicting expert testimony, Russell L.J., commented:
I am not satisfied on the present evidence that on the proper
construction of this specification, addressed as it is to persons
skilled in the relevant art or science, the claim extends to ster-
ile surgical sutures produced not only from a homopolymer
of glycolide but also from a copolymer of glycolide and up to
15 per cent of lactide. That is to say that I do not consider
that a prima facie case of infringement is established.118
Lord Diplock, in the House of Lords decision in American
Cyanamid, characterized the Court of Appeal's legal analysis as
trying the issue of infringement on the conflicting affidavit evi-
dence before the court without the benefit of oral testimony or
cross-examination. He argued that no rule of law required that
the plaintiff must demonstrate a strong prima facie case. 119 In-
stead, Lord Diplock outlined the principles which a court should
consider in deciding whether to grant preliminary relief:
115. American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] R.P.C. 513 (H.L. 1973).
116. Id. at 520.
117. Id. at 531.
118. Id. at 529.
119. Id. at 541.
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[The Court should] consider whether if the plaintiff were to
succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent
injunction he would be adequately compensated by an award
of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of
the defendant's continuing to do what was sought to be en-
joined between the time of the application and the time of
the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common
law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be
in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunc-
tion should normally be granted, however strong the plain-
tiff's claim appeared to be at that stage. 121
Lord Diplock further argued that:
It is where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective
remedies in damages available to either party or to both, that
the question of balance of convenience arises. It would be
unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which
may need to be taken into consideration in deciding where
the balance lies, let alone to suggest the relative weight to be
attached to them. These will vary from case to case. 1 2
1
Moreover, as far as the strength of the parties' respective cases
was concerned, he said:
[I]f the extent of the uncompensatable disadvantage to each
party would not differ widely, it may not be improper to take
into account in tipping the balance the relative strength of
each party's case as revealed by the affidavit evidence ad-
duced on the hearing of the application.... The court is not
justified in embarking upon anything resembling a trial of
the action upon conflicting affidavits in order to evaluate the
strength of either party's case.122
In Series 5 Software Ltd. v. Clarke, 23 the court reviewed the
law relating to the grant of preliminary injunctions. There, the
plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the defend-
ants, former employees of the plaintiff, from contacting any of
the plaintiff's customers and using or disclosing to any third
party several of the plaintiff's alleged trade secrets. 12 4 It was not,
therefore, a case relating to patent infringement.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 541-42.
122. Id. at 542.
123. [1996] 1 All E.R. 853 (Eng. Ch. 1995).
124. Id. at 853-54.
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In the Series 5 Software decision, Justice Laddie recognized
that it was well-known that there had been a major shift in the
attitude of the English courts' approach to the grant of interloc-
utory injunctions following the speeches of the House of Lords
in 1974 in the American Cyanamid case. 2 5 Since American Cyana-
mid, it has been suggested on a number of occasions, that it was
now no longer appropriate to consider the apparent strength or
weakness of the plaintiff's case as a significant factor in deciding
whether to grant a preliminary injunction.12 Justice Laddie also
admitted, however, that courts still assessed the relative strengths
of the parties' cases, disregarding the guidance given in American
Cyanamid.'2 7 Consequently, he reviewed the relevant authorities
and determined that the "likelihood of success" at trial is a rele-
vant factor for considering whether to grant a preliminary in-
junction.12 8
As Justice Laddie pointed out in the Series 5 Software case,
the consequence of requiring a plaintiff to show a strong prima
facie case was, as occurred in American Cyanamid, that the hearing
of the application for a preliminary injunction lasted "two work-
ing weeks [with] the parties argu[ing] questions of polymer
chemistry, infringement, and validity", while the court failed to
evaluate the pros and cons of granting the injunction.' 29 This
approach, if correct, would invariably force the parties to con-
sider all the issues which were for determination at trial. In all
but the most straightforward cases, a court will be unable to de-
cide that a plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case. As a
result, preliminary injunctions would become virtually impossi-
ble to obtain, no matter how severe the damage suffered by the
plaintiff.
Justice Laddie referred to the passages from Lord Diplock's
speech, cited above, and concluded that it was legitimate for the
court to consider the relative strength of the parties' cases as
disclosed by the affidavits.' 0 This approach follows the ap-
proaches that have been applied in Scotland for many years.13'
125. Id. at 857-60.
126. Id. at 858-60.
127. Id. at 858.
128. Id. at 860.
129. Id. at 862.
130. Id.
131. See N.W.L. Ltd. v. Woods, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1294 (H.L. 1979).
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A court should not, however, conduct a mini-trial of the kind the
Court of Appeal undertook in American Cyanamid.
Finally, Justice Laddie summed up the issues a court should
bear in mind when deciding whether to grant a preliminary in-
junction:
(1) The grant of a preliminary injunction is a matter of dis-
cretion and depends on all the facts Of the case.
(2) There are no fixed rules as to when an injunction should
or should not be granted. The relief must be kept flexible.
(3) Because of the practice adopted on the hearing of appli-
cations for interlocutory relief, the court should rarely at-
tempt to resolve complex issues of disputed fact or law.
(4) Major factors the court can bear in mind are (a) the ex-
tent to which damages are likely to be an adequate remedy
for each party and the ability of the other party to pay, (b) the
balance of convenience, (c) the maintenance of the status
quo, and (d) any clear view the court may reach as to the
relative strength of the parties' cases. 1 2
After weighing each factor, Justice Laddie declined to grant the
plaintiff a preliminary injunction.1 3 3
d. The Speed of Decision
It is also worth noting that the two Patent Judges, Justice
Laddie and Justice Jacob, have committed themselves to expedit-
ing the court process and have indicated that parties to an action
for patent infringement who seek a trial within twelve months
will receive one. Indeed, complex patent actions are currently
being tried within twelve months of the commencement of pro-
ceedings and trial dates for trademark infringement are tried
even sooner. In view of the difficulties which patentees have tra-
ditionally faced in securing preliminary injunctions in patent ac-
tions, particularly because of the requirement of showing un-
compensable damage, plaintiffs may, in the future, rely more
upon a speedy trial than an application for a preliminary injunc-
tion in all but the most urgent cases.
e. Avaliability of Summary Judgment for Patent Infringement
Where there is no arguable defense, the Rules of the
132. Series 5 Software, [1996] 1 All E.R. at 865.
133. Id. at 869.
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Supreme Court provide that summary judgment may be ob-
tained under what is known as an Order XIV.13 4 It was held by
the Court of Appeal in 1991, however, that where issues of fact
were in dispute, it was not appropriate to make a finding of in-
fringement without testing the evidence by cross-examination at
trial. 5 It is, therefore, difficult to envision a case where sum-
mary judgment for infringement is likely to be appropriate.
f. Document Discovery After the Close of Pleadings
The obligation to comply with an order for documentary
discovery has already been referred to. The usual procedure is
that, after the close of pleadings, there is an automatic interpartes
documentary discovery."3 6 The general rule is that documents
relating to the issues in the case are discoverable, subject to the
privilege for attorney/client communications. The obligation to
disclose extends to documents that may enable either party to
advance his case or damage his opponent's case and extends to
the documents of one party which may damage his own case.1 3 7
Over the last twenty years or so, the volume of documents in
a discovery request in patent suits has steadily increased to the
point where, by the late 1980s, parties to patent actions could, in
many cases, be swamped by the quantities of paperwork ex-
changed on discovery. Significant changes to the Rules of the
Supreme Court have been implemented3 ' and came into force
on December 1, 1995. Broadly speaking, these rules limit auto-
matic discovery of material relating to three issues, namely valid-
ity, infringement, and commercial success, and specify the infor-
mation which the parties must disclose. 1 9
In relation to validity, without a specific order from a court,
only documents dated within two years of the date of the discov-
ery order are discoverable. No documents relating to infringe-
ment will be ordered if a defendant produces full particulars of
the product or process alleged to infringe. Similarly, no docu-
mentary discovery will be given to support commercial success
134. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 14.
135. Strix Ltd. v. Otter Controls Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 354, 366 (CA 1991).
136. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 11.
137. Compagnie Financiere Et Commerciale Du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co.,
[1882] 11 QBD 55, 62-63 (C.A. 1882).
138. See, e.g., RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 48.
139. Id.
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because a patentee is now required to produce particulars."4
g. Discovery of Confidential Documents
141
It is not necessarily sufficient for a document to receive pro-
tection from discovery solely because it contains sensitive com-
mercial information. Instead, there must be some real indica-
tion as to why public disclosure would be harmful.1 42 Absent
agreement between the parties, a court will issue protective or-
ders when appropriate and will, if necessary, have the court hear-
ing held in camera when a party will refer to sensitive material.
h. Discovery Concerning a Secret Process14
When a defendant claims the allegedly infringing process is
a trade secret, he may seek to restrict a plaintiffs extent of dis-
covery.14 4 Warner Lambert Co. v. Glaxo Laboratories Ltd., 45 in-
volved the manufacturing of two patents relating to steroid com-
pounds. The allegedly infringing Glaxo product was sold in the
United Kingdom under the trade name Betnovate. 146
Glaxo claimed that its process contained valuable commer-
cial secrets, but allowed discovery of the manufacturing process
to Warner Lambert's counsel, solicitors, patent agent, and one
expert. Such discovery was conditioned on the agreement that
they would not divulge the information to any others, including
Warner Lambert, and, further, that they would use the informa-
tion solely for the purposes of the legal action.147 Warner Lam-
bert then sought disclosure without any restrictions upon
Warner's chief executive officer, Warner's U.S. general counsel,
Warner's U.S. patent counsel, and an Italian scientist, who was
an Italian resident and employed by Warner Lambert in Italy.' 48
The court allowed disclosure only to the chief executive of-
ficer. The principles enunciated were:
140. Id. at Order 104, rule 11.
141. Id. at Order 104, rule 11(7).
142. See Diamond Shamrock Technologies SA.'s Patent, [1987] R.P.C. 91, 93
(Eng. Ch. 1986).
143. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 11 (6).
144. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Glaxo Laboratories Ltd., [1975] R.P.C. 354 (C.A.
1975).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 355.
147. Id. at 359.
148. Id. at 362.
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(i) that the Court should seek to order as much inspection
as possible whilst seeking to avoid disclosure that would dam-
age the trade secrets of the disclosing party. Orders restrict-
ing discovery could be made and varied as the case
progressed;
(ii) although the general rule is that a party should know
what is disclosed to his legal advisers, this can be modified
where appropriate and, if necessary, exclusion of disclosure
may be justified;
(iii) in this case it was impossible to determine the nature of
the process used from the end product. Further, policing of
any terms imposed would be impossible. Therefore, further
disclosure should be limited to the Chief Executive only.149
More recently, the Court of Appeal again addressed this
subject in Roussel Uclaf v. Imperial Chemical Industries Pc.150 The
patent in that case related to a process for producing the active
ingredient of an insecticide. Imperial Chemical Industries was
marketing the insecticide in France under the trade name "Ka-
rate." 51 Roussel analyzed that product and concluded that "Ka-
rate" infringed their patent. Roussel based this conclusion upon
the results of their analysis and certain statements made in Impe-
rial Chemical's own literature. Roussel brought infringement
proceedings in both France and in the United Kingdom. Impe-
rial Chemical prepared a confidential resume of its allegedly in-
fringing process and submitted it to independent advisers of the
plaintiff on a written promise of confidentiality.
Roussel wanted two members of its patent department to
have access to the details of the process.15 Both individuals
whom Roussel sought to become appraised of Imperial Chemi-
cal's process were French citizens and residents and were also
involved in the parallel infringement proceedings in France."5 3
No discovery obligation existed in France which was equivalent
to that which existed in the United Kingdom. Imperial Chemi-
cal was concerned, inter alia, that restrictions on the use of the
information would be impossible and that disclosure would give
Roussel an advantage in the French proceedings.
149. Id. at 360-61.
150. [1990] R.P.C. 45 (C.A. 1989).
151. Id. at 47.
152. Id. at 47-48.
153. Id. at 48.
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The Court of Appeal understood Imperial Chemical's con-
cerns, but noted that the description of the process and Imperial
Chemical's confidential documents were important to Roussel's
case. The court argued that some individual at Roussel should
have access to the documents and, because notices of experi-
ments were currently being finalized, it was the proper time to
make the documents available. Consequently, the court allowed
disclosure to one person working under the supervision of the
head of Roussel's patent department so long as that person will
not assist or be involved in the French proceedings and that he
will promise to keep the information confidential. 54 A cross-
undertaking offered by Roussel to compensate Imperial Chemi-
cal in damages for any misuse of the information was embodied
in the court order.
i. Interrogatories'
In order to assist a plaintiff in establishing patent infringe-
ment, the plaintiff may submit interrogatories that ask what pro-
cess the defendant uses and, if the defendant is not the manufac-
turer, from whom he purchases the allegedly infringing arti-
cles. 56 A plaintiff may only send interrogatories to a defendant,
however, after documentary discovery has proceeded in the nor-
mal manner, i.e., after the close of pleadings. Interrogatories,
therefore, are a means of supplementing inadequate documen-
tary discovery from the defendant.
j. Inspection of Machine1 57
English courts have the jurisdiction to order the inspection
of a machine which is alleged to infringe a patent. 158 Before a
court will order such an inspection, however, a plaintiff must
first establish by evidence, a substantial and genuine issue to be
tried and prove that inspection of the machine is essential for
the proper determination of the matter. 159 Such an order will
154. Id. at 51-53.
155. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 11(2), Order 24, rule 1(4).
156. Osram Lamp Works, Ltd. v. Gabriel Lamp Co., [1914] 2 Ch.D 129, 131 (CA
1914).
157. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 11(8).
158. Id.
159. See Smith Myers Communications Ltd. v. Motorola Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 262,
269 (Eng. Ch. 1991).
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usually be sought at a hearing of the Summons for Directions,
namely, after the close of pleadings. Only in exceptional cases
will inspection be ordered before issues have been clarified by
pleadings. 16 0
k. Inspection of Process
English courts also have jurisdiction to order the inspection
of a defendant's manufacturing process and the reconstruction
of a discontinued process for the purpose of such inspection.
Again, a court will only issue such an order where it is essential
and an alternative method of establishing a fact is not possi-
ble.16 A mere belief or suspicion that a process infringes a pat-
ent is normally insufficient evidence for a court to order inspec-
tion. 1  Note the antipathy of the English courts as to what is
often characterized as "fishing expeditions."1 6 1 Similar to in-
spections of machines, an order seeking the inspection of a pro-
cess is normally sought after the Summons for Directions.
1. Discovery/Inspection before Pleadings
i. General Principles
The general rule is that documentary discovery before
pleadings is not allowed unless it is desirable to minimize costs
or to achieve a speedy and proper conclusion of a dispute. 164
In Intel Corp. v. General Instrument Corp.,' 6 5 Intel contended that
the defendants constituted a group of centrally controlled com-
panies, rendering it impossible to determine which companies
had completed specific acts. 16 6 The court, however, refused to
order discovery of some of the particulars of patent infringe-
160. Id.
161. Often, a defendant will produce a process description, as Imperial Chemical
did in Roussel Uclaf, thus, obviating the need for a process inspection. Roussel Uclaf,
[1990] R.P.C. 45 (C.A. 1989).
162. Wahl and Simon-Solitec Ltd. v. Buhler-Miag (England) Ltd., [1979] F.S.R.
183 (Eng. Ch. 1979).
163. A fishing expedition is when a party uses "the courts to find out information
beyond the fair scope of the lawsuit." BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 637 (6th ed. 1990).
Typical examples of this might include, "loose, vague, unfocused questioning of a wit-
ness or the overly broad use of the discovery process." Id.
164. See Intel Corp. v. General Instrument Corp., [1989] F.S.R. 640, 641 (Erg. Ch.
1989).
165. [1989] F.S.R. 640 (Eng. Ch. 1989).
166. Id. at 647.
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ment before the pleadings." 7
ii. Discovery of Names of Infringers
An action seeking to compel a defendant to disclose the
names and addresses of persons who infringed a plaintiff's pat-
ent is a legal action against a defendant against whom the plain-
tiff has another cause of action.1 68 For example, a plaintiff might
have an action for infringement or for breach of an equitable
duty not to part with goods knowingly infringed. Such an action
also lies against an innocent defendant who, through no fault of
his own, may have facilitated the infringement. 169
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise170
concerned a plaintiff's patent for a compound known as
furazolidone. 171 The patent was being infringed by the illicit im-
portation of pirated furazolidone that was manufactured
abroad.171 In order to obtain the names and addresses of the
importers, the patentee brought an action against the Commis-
sioner of Customs & Excise.173 The plaintiff alleged the infringe-
ment of the patent and sought disclosure of the relevant infor-
mation. The Commissioner claimed that the information was
confidential. 74 Nevertheless, the court ordered discovery of the
names and addresses of the importers. 175 During the appeal, the
patentee abandoned its claim that the Commissioner had in-
fringed the patent and the appeal proceeded as an action solely
for discovery.
The court held that where a person, albeit innocently and
without incurring any personal liability, becomes involved in the
tortious acts of others, he comes under a duty to assist the party
injured by those acts.' 76 This entails providing the injured party
with complete information in discovery and disclosing the iden-
tity of wrongdoers.177 For discovery purposes, it mattered not
167. Id. at 640.
168. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 2(20).
169. [1974] A.C. 133, 175 (H.L. 1973).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 137.
172. Nonvwich, [1974] A.C. at 137.
173. Id. at 137-38.
174. Id. at 138.
175. Id. at 151-52.
176. Id. at 175.
177. Id.
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that such involvement was the result of voluntary action or the
consequence of the performance of a duty, statutory or other-
wise.'17  The Commissioner, therefore, was prima facie under a
duty to disclose the information sought. The names of infring-
ers is not confidential information. The Commissioner's posi-
tion would have been different, however, if the information
sought was. confidential. 79
A court may order disclosure of the name of an unknown
foreigner who is responsible for a breach of a law other than a
law of the United Kingdom. Such an order, however, should not
be made at the interlocutory stage, unless the court is reasonably
satisfied that a plaintiff would probably suffer irreparable dam-
age if there were a delay in ordering discovery.' °
iii. Inspection of Machinery/Process
Where the defendant conducts his business in secret and
the plaintiff, although able to establish a strong prima facie pre-
sumption of infringement, cannot offer the particulars of the al-
legedly infringing acts, a court may order inspection of the de-
fendant's process.1 8 ' Inspection of a process18 2 is generally not
ordered until the Summons for Directions stage. In Unilever Plc.
v. Pearce,8 ' the English Patents Court encountered a case involv-
ing the suspected infringement of a patented process for treat-
ing lignocellulose materials, such as straw, to improve its digesti-
bility as a feedstuff for cattle. There, the court was satisfied that
this was not a mere "fishing expedition" by Unilever and that
there was a genuine and substantial triable issue.' 8 4 The court
did not require the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of pat-
ent infringement."8 5 Prior to the delivery of the statement of
claim and particulars of infringement, Unilever sought inspec-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Global Pharmaceutics Ltd., [1986]
R.P.C. 394, 398 (C.A. 1983).
181. Edler v. Victoria Press Mfg. Co., [1910] 27 R.P.C. 114 (Eng. Ch. 1910). In this
case, the plaintiff, his solicitor and no more than three experts were permitted to in-
spect a defendant's process, Id. at 114.
182. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 104, rule 11 (9).
183. [1985] F.S.R. 475 (Eng. Ch. 1984).
184. Id. at 484.
185. Id. at 485.
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tion of Mr. Pearce's machinery'and of the process of its use.'86
The defendant resisted such inspection by asserting that the
process was confidential. 18 7 The court authorized the inspection
of the machinery that produced the straw pellets, which were
treated according to the patented process, because the machin-
ery was "property" within the meaning of Order 29, rule 2 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court .188 The court, however, did not
allow inspection of the defendant's process because that was a
matter to be addressed on the summons for directions.189 Those
allowed to inspect the machinery included a solicitor, a Unilever
patent agent, and an independent consultant.'
c. Preservation of Evidence
i. The Anton Piller Order
The Anton Piller order19' is a form of discovery preservation
granted on exparte application. It can comprise of an injunction
to restrain infringement, permission to enter a defendant's
premises to inspect documents and remove the originals or cop-
ies of the originals, permission to remove allegedly infringing
goods, and an injunction to restrain a defendant from disclosing
the content of the injunction to third parties for a specified pe-
riod.192 It is available pursuant to either the inherent jurisdic-
tion of the court or Order 29 of the Supreme Court Rules.' 9
3
186. Id. at 476.
187. Id. at 477.
188. Id. at 478-79. Order 29, rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides, in
relevant part:
(1) on the application of any party to a cause or matter the Court may make
an order for the detention, custody or preservation of any property which is
the subject-matter of the cause or matter, or as to which any question may
arise therein, or for the inspection of any such property in the possession of a
party to the cause or matter. (2) For the purpose of enabling any order under
paragraph (1) to be carried out the Court may by the order authorise any
person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party to the
cause or matter.
RSC, supra note 75, at Order 29, rule 2.
189. Unilever, [1985] F.S.R. at 479.
190. Id. at 485-86.
191. Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] F.S.R. 129 (C.A.
1975).
192. Id. at 131-32.
193. RSC, supra note 75, at Order 29.
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There are, however, four prerequisites a plaintiff must establish
before a court will grant such an order:
(1) a strong prima facie case against the defendant;
(2) that the potential or actual damage done to the plaintiff
by the defendant is serious;
(3) clear evidence that the defendant has relevant and in-
criminating documents or items in his possession, and that
there is a real possibility that the defendant would destroy
such material before any inter partes application can be made;
and
(4) should an order be made, it would do no real harm to the
defendant or his case. 194
The procedure courts must follow when implementing an Anton
Piller Order is set forth in Universal Thermosensors Ltd. v. Hib-
ben.' 95
ii. The Sarwar Order
A court order which is less draconian than an Anton Piller
order is the Sarwar order.'96 It is less draconian because it does
not allow the party seeking the order to enter the opposing
party's premises. 19 7 It does, however, require defendants to dis-
close the names and addresses of the suppliers of the infringing
products and surrender all order books and other relevant docu-
ments.198
iii. Use of Information Obtained Pursuant to Sarwar and
Norwich Pharmacal Orders
Where information is obtained pursuant to a Sarwar order
or a Norwich Pharmacal order for the purpose of pursuing third
parties, there is no implied undertaking that the information will
be used solely for the purpose of the existing action. Accord-
ingly, unless the order specifically contains a restriction upon
the use of the information, it is unnecessary to apply to the court
for leave to utilize it. If the order includes a restriction on its
use, however, a court will normally permit, upon subsequent ap-
plication, use of the information for pursuing other parties and
194. Anton Piller, [1976] F.S.R. at 130-32.
195. [1992] 3 All E.R. 257 (Eng. Ch. 1991).
196. E.M.I. Ltd. v. Sarwar & Haidar, [1977] F.S.R. 146 (CA. 1976).
197. Id. at 147.
198. Id.
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even to pursue criminal remedies. 99 Upon a party's subsequent
application, a court will rarely authorize disclosure of informa-
tion to third parties.
iv. Applicability of Anton Piller and Sarwar Orders to
Patent Infringement
Although available for use in cases of patent infringement,
the Anton Piller and Sarwar orders are more commonly em-
ployed in counterfeiting cases involving trademark and copy-
right infringement. This is due to the character of the defend-
ants in those cases, who, often by the nature of their business,
are likely to dispose of incriminating evidence if apprised of a
pending discovery order by inter partes service. For example,
such defendants would include street traders selling counterfeit
Rolex watches, fake Gucci clothing, or mail order operations
that sell pirated video cassettes of movies. The procedures are
potentially available, however, for use in patent infringement
cases and, thus, may constitute a part of a plaintiffs arsenal.
d. Mareva Injunctions
A Mareva Injunction is also available in the English Courts.
A Mareva Injunction is an interim injunction which prevents a
defendant from disposing of its assets. A court must be satisfied
that there are grounds for believing that the assets are in the
defendant's control in thatjurisdiction and that they are likely to
be removed, so as to frustrate the enforcement of an award of
damages.
7. Extra-Territorial Injunctions
Can English courts grant extra-territorial injunctions? Arti-
cle 5(3) of the Convention does not give the courts of a Member
State the jurisdiction to rule on a case of foreign infringe-
ment.2"' If the jurisdiction is founded on the basis of the de-
fendant's domicile, however, under Article 2, a court must try
matters relating to the infringement of a parallel patent, deter-
mining whether infringement occurred by applying the law of
the state in which the patent is registered. 0 '
199. Sony Corp. v. Anand, [1981) F.S.R. 398, 402-03 (Eng. Ch. 1981).
200. Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3), O.J. L 304/77, at 79 (1978).
201. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 304/77, at 78 (1978).
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In the past, English courts have generally refused to accept
jurisdiction where it involved the enforcement of foreign intel-
lectual property rights. It has not been entirely clear whether
this was based on the idea that infringements occurring in other
jurisdictions are a local, as opposed to a transitory act, and,
therefore, justiciable only in the jurisdiction where it arises. An-
other possible explanation of why English courts are reluctant to
enforce foreign intellectual property rights is because of the
English double actionability rule,202 the Mocambique rule.
2 1 3
Broadly speaking, these rules maintain that English courts would
decline to hear an action unless the act complained of was ac-
tionable under both English law and the law2°4 of the state where
the tortious act occurred. The problem for patentees was, that
because the sale of an infringing product in Germany would not
amount to the infringement of a U.K. patent, the test was not
satisfied and an English court could not preside over the case.
The Mocambique rule does not apply to Convention countries.
The double actionability rule has recently been replaced, how-
ever, by the Private International Law Act of 1995,205 which con-
tains the Choice of Applicable Law Rule.20 6
The Choice of Applicable Law Rule provides that English
courts must apply the law of the country in which the alleged
tortious act took place2 0 7 except where the connection to the
tortious act with another country renders the law of the other
state more appropriate.20 8 In the context of patent infringe-
ment, the impact of this rule may be illustrated by an example.
Suppose an English company is alleged to infringe both a Ger-
man and an English patent. This rule enables the patentee to
apply to English courts for a grant of an extra-territorial injunc-
tion to restrain the infringement in Germany and England, Ger-
202. See AN. DIcEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICr OF LAws 1487-88 (12th ed.
1993). The rule is derived from the case of Phillips v. Eyre, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1 (1870), and
the House of Lords, Opinions in Boys v. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L. 1971).
203. See Tyburn Prods. Ltd. v. Conan Doyle, [1990] 1 All E.R. 909 (Eng. Ch. 1990).
The rule is derived from the case of British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo-
cambique, [1893] A.C. 602 (H.L. 1893).
204. See Tyburn, (1990] 1 All E.R. at 916.
205. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (Eng.).
206. Id. Part III, §§ 11-12.
207. Id. Part III, § 11(1).
208. Id. Part III, § 12(1)-12(2).
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man and English law being applicable for the determination of
the infringement in Germany and England respectively.
There would, therefore, now appear to be no bar to English
courts assuming jurisdiction in disputes involving foreign pat-
ents. In Chiron Corp. v. Murex Diagnostics Ltd. & Chiron Corp. v.
Organon Teknika Ltd.,209 Justice Aldous held an English court
cannot grant an injunction which would have an impact outside
the United Kingdom.2 10 He also expressed the view that a Dutch
court could not be sure that an injunction would be appropriate
in the United Kingdom because "there are considerations which
have to be taken into account by a United Kingdom judge
before deciding that injunctive relief is appropriate, which do
not appear relevant in a Dutch Court."211
This statement was, however, obiter dictum, and it is doubtful
whether this approach will be followed by the current patent
judges, Justice Laddie and Justice Jacob, who have not yet ruled
on whether an English court can grant an extra-territorial in-
junction. In the context of copyright infringement, Justice Lad-
die has said, "so it may follow that, despite the traditional rule,
British domiciled individuals or companies who infringe (say) a
French or German copyright not only may, but must, be sued
here."212 Justice Jacob has said, "it seems unavoidable that we
should assume jurisdiction over foreign (or at least other Euro-
pean State) infringements given what is happening in Europe.
If we do not the Continental Europeans will simply take over."213
Indeed, the Patents County Court has already granted an order
which restrained the first defendants from infringing two Euro-
pean patents granted in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and
the Netherlands.21 4
8. Costs
The cost of patent litigation in England has traditionally
been higher than the cost of patent litigation conducted else-
where in Europe. This has arisen for two reasons. First, in Eng-
209. [1995] F.S.R. 325, 338 (CA. 1995).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 577.
212. HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT 917 (2nd ed. 1995).
213. Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Special Public Bill Committee on the
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, dated Jan. 23, 1995.
214. AMP v. Goodway Indus. Co., No. 91 PAT 0020 (Eng. Ch. 1991) (unreported).
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land, validity of a patent is tried simultaneously with the issue of
patent infringement. Second, the common law procedure in-
volving documentary discovery with cross-examination of wit-
nesses at trial increases litigation costs. Nevertheless, with the
new approach towards expediting the time to trial, the new rules
on discovery, and a strong awareness of the need to contain costs
so as to be competitive with continental jurisdictions, it is likely
that the former cost differentials will decrease.
B. Germany
1. Procedure
Germany has eleven district courts, each of which can hear
patent disputes. These courts must accept patents at face value
and cannot determine a patent's validity. Of these district
courts, four courts tend to hear the majority of such cases. 15 A
party may challenge the validity of a patent in proceedings
before the German Patent Office or in a nullification action in
the Federal Patent Court.
Documentary discovery is granted only on specific applica-
tion to the court. Thus, in the context of process patents, where
reverse engineering of the process or product alleged to infringe
is either impossible or produces equivocal results, the lack of
available documentary discovery of a defendant's process can,
on occasions, prove insuperable.
2. The Test for Infringement
Courts in Germany have traditionally construed claims
broadly and have tended to find infringement in cases where the
variant is an obvious solution to the problem addressed by the
patent. In the Improver Corp. v. Remington Products Inc., 16 the
Dusseldorf Oberlandesgericht, the Dusseldorf Court of Appeals,
reached the opposite conclusion to that reached by Justice Hoff-
man in the English Chancery court. There, the Dusseldorf
Oberlandesgericht, declared that when evaluating the scope of
the protection of a patent within the context of Article 69, the
question of infringement could only be decided by the notional
skilled man "on the basis of reflections progressing from the
215. These four courts include Hamburg, Munich, Dusseldorf, and Mannheim,
with Dusseldorf as the favorite jurisdiction for plaintiffs.
216. 21 IIC 572 (1990), 24 IIC 838 (1993), [1993) GRUR Int. 242.
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meaning of the patent claims, i.e., of the invention described
therein." 17 In an earlier case,2 18 the Dusseldorf Obeslandesger-
icht stated that in relation to the question of patent infringe-
ment:
[I] t must first of all be established, on the basis of the under-
standing of a person skilled in the art, what is the content of
the claims, i.e., the meaning which a person skilled in the art
would give to the wording of the claim ... what is decisive in
whether the person skilled in the art, by studying the inven-
tion described in the patent claims, was able to discover the
altered means used in the device attacked.219
In the Moulded Kerbstone case,220 the patent at issue related
to a moulded kerbstone with specifically arranged channels.
The principal claim read:
Integral or-cross-sectionally multi-part moulded stone with a
longitudinal trough for dewatering lines at the side of the
road, characterised by the fact that it comprises at least one
cross-channel branching off from the longitudinal trough
and opening into the side of the stone facing away from the
street center.
2 21
The patented kerbstone is shown in Figure 4.
The defendant city built roads, as shown in Figure 5, with
commercially available kerbstones leaving dewatering gaps be-
tween the kerbstones. The German Landesgericht found for the
plaintiff, holding that the patent was infringed by the City.22 2
The German Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Landesgericht and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff ap-
pealed to the Bundesgerichtshof, the German Federal Supreme
Court.
The Bundesgerichtshof remanded the matter back to the
Court of Appeals, and in so doing, made a number of observa-
tions concerning the reasoning used by the Court of Appeals. In
217. Improver, [1990] F.S.R. at 198 (citing Improver, 21 IIC 572 (1990), 24 IIC 838
(1993), [1993] GRUR Int. 242).
218. Ion Analysis, [1989] GRUR 205 (OLG 1988).
219. Id. at 211.
220. [1991] R.P.C. 597 (BGH 1986).
221. Id at 600.
222. Id. at 602.
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FIGURE 4
particular, while admitting that the dismissal of the complaint
may have been correct, the Bundesgerichtshof disapproved of
the terms adopted by the Court of Appeals such as the "principle
of the invention."2 23 The case was decided by the issue of
whether the average person skilled in the art was able to deter-
mine the equally effective means of the alleged infringement
from the claims using the description and drawings and based
on his professional knowledge.
In the Segmentation Device2 4 case, the patent in the suit re-
lated to a device for segmenting tree trunks into wood products
finished on all sides. The allegedly infringing product incorpo-
rated all of the features of the patent, except that the patented
invention included some "sawing"225 steps while the allegedly in-
fringing product incorporated related moulding steps for
smoothing the surface of logs. 22 6 The court regarded the varia-
tion to represent an inventive step over the patent and, thus,
found no infringement. 227
On appeal, the Dusseldorf Court of Appeals held that the
223. Id. at 605.
224. 26 11C 261 (BGH 1995).
225. Id. at 263.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 264.
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variation infringed the patent. 228 It found that the word "saw-
ing" used in the claim encompassed "moulding," which was used
228. Id.
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by the defendant for the same purpose and with the same result,
namely, to smooth the surface of the logs. 229
The German Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals
holding.230 It disagreed with the court's formulation of the term
"smoothening device" to include the original feature of the
claim as well as the feature used in the defendant's product.23 1
In examining patent infringement, the German Supreme Court
followed the approach set forth in the Moulded Kerbstone and Ion
Analysis cases.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the English Court of Appeal
decision in Daily v. Etablissements Fernand Berchet.232 In that case,
the plaintiff was the proprietor of a patent for a walking aid de-
vice. Claim one required the patent to have, inter alia, "a brak-
ing arrangement associated with the rear wheels."233 The de-
fendant's product, the Locopousse baby walker, featured down-
ward extensions at the rear of the product, which were known as
"rear anti-topple Stop [s] .,"24 As a result of the flexibility of the
rear wheels and suspension, these stops could extend to the
ground upon the exertion of downward pressure. On some sur-
faces, this had the effect of retarding the motion of the toy. The
plaintiff sued for patent infringement. The patent drawing is
shown in Figure 6.
The English Patents County Court found the patent valid
and infringed.23 5 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal held
that there was no infringement of the patent. It held that even if
the downward stops could be said to be a "braking arrange-
ment", it was not "associated with the rear wheels."23 6
It is instructive to speculate what the result of this case
might have been had it been tried in German rather than Eng-
lish courts. Following the reasoning adopted in German cases,
one is tempted to believe that the German courts might well
have found infringement in this case, whereas, the English Court
of Appeal did not.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 266.
231. Id. at 265-66.
232. [1992] F.S.R. 533 (CA 1992).
233. Id. at 536-37.
234. Id. at 535.
235. Id. at 534.
236. Id. at 538.
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3. Availability of Preliminary Injunctions
Preliminary injunctions are available in Germany. It ap-
pears, however, that they are rarely sought and German courts
are reluctant to grant them. To obtain a preliminary injunction,
German courts require a plaintiff to establish a strong primafacie
case of infringement. The courts have indicated that a prelimi-
nary injunction should only be granted if infringement may be
determined without difficulty. A party cannot determine in-
fringement without difficulty when a patented product or pro-
cess is complex or when claims of a patent are alleged to have
been carried out by equivalents. 23 7 If a court is unable to deter-
mine infringement in the absence of an expert's assistance, the
court must refuse to grant the injunction.3 8
Further, while the validity of the patent is presumed, the
court may only grant a preliminary injunction if it holds no
237. Gert Wurtenberger, Interlocutoy Injunctions against Patent and Utility Model In-
fringements in Germany, [1993] 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 55.
238. Id.
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doubts concerning the patent's validity.28 9 This may set a high
hurdle for the patentee, particularly where proceedings are
pending for opposition to, or nullity of, the patent.
Finally, a preliminary injunction will only be granted where
the patentee can demonstrate a need for immediate relief.2 ° In
deciding whether to grant the injunction, German courts also
consider the relative hardship which the patentee and the al-
leged infringer will incur as a consequence of either granting or
not granting the injunction. 41
4. Speed of Decision
On average, the time it takes to obtain a first instance deci-
sion, approximately twelve months from initiation of the pro-
ceedings, is comparable to the trial dates now being fixed in the
United Kingdom.
5. The Availability of other Remedies
In Germany, an equivalent to the Mareva Injunction is avail-
able, although there is no procedure similar to the Anton Piller
order, whereby a party can obtain an ex parte order for the pres-
ervation of evidence.
6. Extra-Territorial Injunctions
On the basis of the principle of territoriality, German courts
have traditionally refused to protect foreign intellectual property
rights. More recently, however, it has been established that Ger-
man courts have jurisdiction over the infringement of foreign
intellectual property rights because the principle of territoriality
only governs issues of validity of a particular right.24 2
In Kaiser v. Chemax Limited,243 for example, the Dusseldorf
Landergericht assumed jurisdiction over six defendants, five of
whom were British and only one of whom was domiciled in Ger-
many. The German court will apply lex locus delicti and, in this




242. See Kaiser v. Chemax Ltd., Jan. 16, 1996 (unreported).
243. Id.
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7. Costs
In German courts, there are scaled legal fees depending on
the value put on the case by the plaintiff. This has the attraction
of enabling parties to quantify, to some extent, their liability for
expenses at the outset. Major German law firms charge their
clients at an hourly rate rather than the scaled fees. Conse-
quently, costs at the lower end of the scale will tend to be higher
than the scaled fees but will be less than the scaled fees when the
value of the claim is greater.
C. France
1. Procedure
Ten courts of first instance and ten appellate courts in
France have jurisdiction to hear patent disputes. The most pop-
ular of the ten district courts is in Paris. A sale or an offer for
sale of an allegedly infringing product in Paris allows the court
to assume jurisdiction.
2. The Test for Infringement
In France, patents did not contain claims until 1968. The
construction of patent claims tends to be broad, though not as
broad as German courts sometimes construe claims. A product
will infringe where the variant consists of the substitution of an
equivalent for an element of the claimed invention. Addition-
ally, in cases where the function of the whole element or of the
whole invention at the filing or priority date was new and per-
forms substantially the same function and produces a technical
result of the same nature, that product will infringe.
3. Speedy Relief
While preliminary injunctions are available, they are seldom
granted by French courts. In deciding whether to grant an in-
junction, a court will consider the strength of a plaintiff's case
and whether a plaintiff has delayed in seeking preliminary relief.
The time to trial is approximately twelve-to-eighteen months.
4. Other Procedural Aspects of Patent Actions
Under the saisie contrefacon procedure, a patentee can, sub-
ject to payment of a surety, obtain a court order enabling him to
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appoint a bailiff, assisted by an expert of his choice, to carry out
a detailed description of any product or process alleged to con-
stitute an infringement, saisie description, and to seize all infring-
ing articles, drawings, records and books, saisie real. To obtain
such an order, it is not necessary for a patentee to demonstrate
infringement or even the validity of the patent. Under French
law, a court may not refuse to authorize a saisie description,
although it has the discretion to refuse to authorize a saisie real,
which is generally authorized. Such an order can be obtained
against a manufacturer, distributor, or a retailer of allegedly in-
fringing goods. A seizure remedy similar to the saisie contrefacon
is available in Italy" and Belgium,245 and is clearly a potentially
useful remedy for a patentee in obtaining evidence of proof of
infringement.
5. Extra-Territorial Injunctions
A cross-border injunction granted by the Dutch courts
against patent infringement has been enforced in France pursu-
ant to the Convention. 246 The Tribunal de Grande Instance in
Paris has authorized enforcement of such a cross-border injunc-
tion which was granted to restrain a French co-defendant. 247 On
appeal, the appellant argued that French law did not provide for
interlocutory relief for patent infringement. The Court of Ap-
peals dismissed the appeal.
6. Costs
Costs largely depend on the time spent on the matter by a
party's patent agent and trial lawyer. The cost of obtaining a
first instance decision are likely to be somewhat lower in France
than in the United Kingdom. While a contribution towards the
costs of a successful party may be ordered, however, these are
unlikely to exceed ten percent of his actual costs.
244. The Italian counterpart to the saisie description is the descrizione, while the
counterpart to the saisie real is the sequestro.
245. See CODE CMVL art. 1481 (Belg.) (listing counterparts to saisie contrefacon).
246. Eurosensory v. Tieman, noted in, [1995] 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. D-73
(1995).
247. Id. at 391.
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In Italy there are no special courts dealing with patent cases.
Where products are sold or offered for sale in Italy, it is possible
to forum shop for the jurisdiction in which a plaintiff has the
highest chance of obtaining preliminary measures. Jurisdiction
is only refused where distribution of the allegedly infringing
product is de minimis.
2. Availability of a Preliminary Injunction
In Italy, to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
provide strong evidence of both a patent's validity and infringe-
ment before a court will grant a preliminary injunction.
3. Speed of Decision
Patent actions have, until recently, taken up to four to five
years to reach trial. On July 29, 1995, a new code of civil proce-
dure was enacted in Italy with the intent of expediting the trial
process. It is currently not possible, however, to assess how suc-
cessful these reforms are likely to be.
4. Other Procedural Aspects of Patent Actions
The Italian counterparts to the French saisie description and
saise real, descizione and sequestro respectively, are available. These
are generally applied for in tandem with an application for a
preliminary injunction.
5. Costs
Italian courts do not take into account the costs actually in-
curred by the parties. A court will usually order the unsuccessful
party to pay approximately a quarter to one third of the success-
ful party's costs.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen, there are a number of options available to
the prospective plaintiff in choosing ajurisdiction in which to try
an infringement action. A prospective plaintiff should consider
248. See MARIO FRANzozi: A GUIDE TO ITALIAN PATENT LITIGATION 9-13, 25-36, 38-
42 (1995).
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the advantages and disadvantages of litigating a dispute in a par-
ticular forum. Some of the primary factors a plaintiff must take
into account are summarized below:
" Test for Infringement: German courts have, traditionally,
construed patent claims more broadly than courts in other
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the emphasis on the scope
of the claims that has recently been mentioned by German
courts, they still appear to approach the question of in-
fringement by equivalence, with one eye on the philosophy
of the invention. English courts, on the other hand, ap-
pear to have more sympathy for those trying to design
around the patent and, therefore, focus more on the scope
of claims. Total convergence between the approaches of
the various countries appears to be far in the future.
* Availability of Preliminary Injunctions: The availability of pre-
liminary injunctions in patent infringement actions varies
widely across Europe. In France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, they have traditionally been difficult to obtain.
Injunctions granted by the Dutch courts under the Kort
Geding procedure, however, appear to be much easier to
obtain.
" Proving Infringement: There are significant differences
across Europe in the procedures available for securing evi-
dence of infringement. The process of discovery in U.K.
courts is generally viewed as an effective way of securing
evidence of infringement. This is particularly so in cases
such as the alleged infringement of process patents. On
the other hand, a patentee's validity argument could be
prejudiced by his own documents which would be discover-
able in the proceedings. The French and Italian courts also
have a very effective procedure for securing evidence of in-
fringement, namely, the saisie description and descrizione, re-
spectively. These procedures allow patentees to inspect the
premises of alleged infringers without warning and obtain
any evidence of infringement. In Germany, on the other
hand, there is no discovery process and no seizure proceed-
ings.
It is submitted that given the options available to a prospec-
tive plaintiff and the advantages which, depending on the factual
matrix of the particular case, may be gained in so doing, forum
shopping in Europe in patent infringement disputes is likely to
become more common.
1997]

